Need for Unofficial Diplomacy in Indo-Pak ties!

When official diplomacy fails, war begins. Such statement looms large in South Asia in the post 26/11 Mumbai terror attack. The track-one, official, regimented and protocol centric brand of Indo-Pak diplomacy is fast failing to establish relative and negative peace as a result of which both parties have hardened their stand over fixing accountability over the “effects” -- the rise of terror attacks in India. Friendly countries such as U.S, UK, China, Saudi Arabia and Iran are becoming medium of diplomatic interactions, doing ambassadorial jobs and sharing of evidences and possible actions if any official communications break down in the context of brewing or escalation of crisis.

However, question is whether such kind of official diplomacy would yield any result. The answer may be negative. As a matter of fact, diplomatic tirades against another in many occasions have failed to deliver any tangible results and have frozen instead the nuances of official diplomacy. Composite dialogue processes are though very much there, but it always subject to seriousness of both parties in resolving conflicts. There has not been out-of-box thinking and so no negotiating discourses have been added in the existing structure of interactions. Alternatively, both parties have made no sustained efforts to utilise the relevance of unofficial diplomacy or multi-track diplomacy in setting the context for resolution of core issues.

However, the time has come to redefine the contours of diplomacy in post 26/11 terror episode. Various changing factors--massive public opinion generated in India against Pak sponsored terrorism; heightened conscientious civil society and media intervention to campaign against terrorism; Pakistan’s inability to control so called “non-state elements” in its soil; astounding voter turnout and change of guard in J&K and utter rejections of separatists demands; compounding socio-political unrest in Pakistan; and top of this the change of government in United States with heavy baggage of world economic meltdown-- that underscore the need for new diplomatic tools in Indo-Pak crisis. The present Indo-Pak stalemate signals the complex behaviour of official diplomacy and therefore calling for some immediate face saving calculation and actions. Bottom line is that the Indo-Pak conflict is always impregnated with massive annihilations, the rise of international terrorism, and thus threat to regional and global security. Therefore, the more viable alternative tool for addressing the root cause of conflict can be better left to other actors of unofficial diplomacy. It is more moderate, unofficial, low key, non-judgemental, non-coercive and safe. It attempts to create processes in which the participants feel free to share perceptions, fears and need, and also explore ideas for resolution free from the constraints of government positions. It builds the settings in which both parties share a mutual line of communication, goodwill and trust, hence limiting scopes for animosity, recrimination, and misunderstanding.

The need for redefining diplomacy can be factored in the following reasons: First, the traditional instruments of negotiation, mediation and conflict management has proven to be ineffective in cracking in the J&K Conflict, Sir Creek, Siachen, trade disputes, etc., as the “ripeness” of resolving conflict still doubtful proposition in the diplomatic communities or the costs of deescalating or solving the conflict outweigh the benefits.

Second, there is need for shifting the South Asian brand of bilateralism to multilateralism with scope for impartial or non-partisan third parties to resolve protracted J&K conflict. The Simla and Agra Peace processes are too old for any diplomatic breakthrough, except being a reference point in any further political engagement. J&K is not an historical expression to be redrawn but a concrete reality to be accepted as it is between both the parties. Therefore the diplomatic counsel is to accept the good office of the United States or any other individual citizens like the former president Bill Clinton or Jimmy Carter to build the bridge between the two historical antagonistic nations. The problem seems settled with the existing boundary and both India and Pakistan with nuclear warhead in kitty are not amenable to any distribution or redistribution of positions and interests. Nevertheless the third party interventions or mediation would be a distinct certainty only when unofficial actors or citizen participations are allowed to act as possible cushion against reactionary opinion in their domestic constituencies.

Lastly, any diplomatic fire fighting between India and Pakistan need to be insulated from public consumption and therefore attaching government survivability with any possible solution is a dampener to conflict management. Diplomacy in democratic culture is more subject to such danger and therefore scuttling more often various Non-conventional Confidence Building Measure such as sporting and cultural interactions can act contrary to any long term conflict management.


While the present terror actor pitches up Indo-Pak tension, it may possibly upon the window of opportunity to both the parties to rethink the content of decades long engagement from the traditional track one perspective to more unstructured official interactions; so that a positive shift can be envisaged for any permanent and sustainable resolution of conflict.

Gyana Ranjan Panda
Research Officer,
Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability,
A-11, Second Floor, Niti Bagh,
Khelgaon Marg
New Delhi-49
gyana@cbgaindia.org